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1. Introduction
More attention has paid to executive cash bonus plan after the decline in 
executive stock options (Hall and Murphy, 2003). One of the main issues in 
cash bonus plan may be whether cash incentive plan give executive an incen-
tive to act in the interest of shareholders, as in stock options. The purpose of 
this paper is to investigate the effect of incentive plans for directors on the 
performance of their companies in the UK. Particularly, we investigate 
whether companies that changed their pay policies improved their perfor-
mances. Many firms in the UK tried to strengthen the link between executive 
compensation and firm performance by cash compensation while use of stock 
option is limited compared with U.S. (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).
There are relatively few studies on the effect of salary policies on the 
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performance of firms, although there are many studies on the determinants 
of executive compensation (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Conyon, Gregg and 
Machin, 1995; Cosh and Hughes, 1997). Abowd (1990) also showed that higher 
sensitivity of compensation to corporate performance yields a better eco-
nomic return the next year, while Mehran (1995) found that firm performance 
is affected by the percentage of CEO compensation that is equity-based. In 
contrast, Vafeas (2000) failed to find a link between operating performance 
and incentive plans for outside directors.
In this paper, we find a strong connection between these variables. In 
particular, this research shows that companies that change their pay policies 
are more likely to achieve better performances than others. This result is 
consistent with principal-agent theory that predicts a positive relationship 
between pay-performance sensitivity and performance.
2. Hypothesis: incentive plan and performance
According to agency theory, higher performance-pay sensitivity yields 
higher company performance. Then, we analyse the relationship between 
these two variables. The hypotheses analysed here are:
Hypothesis 1 : Companies with higher pay-performance sensitivities 
achieve better performances; and
Hypothesis 2 : Companies that increase their pay-performance sensitivi-
ties achieve better performances.
The difficulty in this study is that we cannot directly observe each com-
pany’s pay-performance sensitivity for a given year. Thus, we redefine pay-
performance sensitivity as the percentage change of payment divided by the 
percentage change of company performance, that is,
t
t
t
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pay
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Using this new definition, we compute each company’s pay-performance 
sensitivity in 1993 and 1994. This sensitivity shows the percentage by which 
pay increases/decreases when company performance increases by 1 per cent. 
We calculate this sensitivity measure for two performance variables: profit 
and earnings per share (EPS). We choose these two variables because they 
are the most frequently used performance criteria in incentive plans for 
directors in large UK companies (Williams, 1994).
We also calculate the ‘sensitivity change dummy variable’, which is set 
to 1 if this sensitivity in 1994 is larger than that in 1993. This sensitivity 
change dummy shows whether the company intensified its performance-pay 
sensitivity.
Large numbers of British companies have some kind of incentive pro-
gramme, such as annual incentive (AI) (Monks partnership, 1994). Many 
companies introduce annual bonuses in their compensations for executives to 
motivate directors to raise their awareness of short-term performances (Wil-
liams, 1994). Thus, we test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 : Companies with annual incentive schemes achieve higher 
company performances than those without such schemes; and
Hypothesis 4 : The performances of companies with newly introduced 
annual incentive programmes are better than other companies.
We assume that pay-performance sensitivity in 1994 has an effect on the 
company performance of that same year, rather than on performance in 1995. 
One reason is that, in many large companies in the UK the performance-pay 
sensitivity for year t is set at the beginning of that year by the remuneration 
committee (Williams, 1994).
3. Research method
In this research, we focus on the probability that companies improve 
their performances in 1994, as a performance variable. The following regres-
sion model is estimated:
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probability (Δperformance > 0)
= a + b1 AI + b2 newAI + b3 sensitivity + b4 sensitivity change + industy_dummies
where AI, the dummy variable that shows whether the company has 
an Annual Incentive (AI) plan, has value 1 if the company has AI;
NewAI, the dummy variable that shows if the company introduced an 
annual bonus, has value 1 if the company has a new AI;
Sensitivity is the variable for performance-pay sensitivity; and
Sensitivity change, which shows whether the sensitivity increased this 
year, has value 1 if the company intensifies its pay-performance sensi-
tivity.
Our hypotheses suggest that all the coefficients for AI, newAI, sensitiv-
ity, and sensitivity change will be positive, as these variables show companies’ 
incentive plans for their directors. Each equation includes an industry dummy 
to exclude industry-specific factors.
4. The data
We estimate above logistic regression for listed companies in 1994. To 
obtain pay-performance sensitivity and the sensitivity change dummy, we 
need data for companies from 1992 to 1994. The data analysed here are taken 
from Monks Partnership’s ‘United Kingdom Board Earnings, October 1995’, 
and ‘United Kingdom Board Earnings, October 1994’. These data sets contain 
comprehensive data on executive compensations, which are collected from 
the annual reports of the companies. The number of companies in these data 
is 1545.
5. Empirical results
There are a number of noticeable features concerning the results in 
tables 1 and 2. One of the most striking results is that we find a positive rela-
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Table 1　Logistic regression: Dependent variable: 
Probability that the company increases its profit in 1994
Equation number Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6
Annual Incentive （AI） 0.314∗∗ 0.261∗
（0.138） （0.149）
New AI 0.263∗ 0.156
（0.151） （0.163）
Total pay sensitivity 0.573∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
（0.300） （0.122）
Total pay sensitivity change 0.824∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
（0.140） （0.151）
Constant 0.882∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
（0.287） （0.275） （0.287） （0.300） （0.297） （0.304）
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood −790 −791 −790 −676 −706 −672
Pseudo-R2 0.0644 0.0632 0.065 0.1212 0.0832 0.1263
valid cases 1415 1415 1415 1358 1358 1358
Sensitivity change　1 if sensitivity intensified, 0 otherwise
Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗: Significant at the 1% level.　　∗∗ Significant at the 5% level.　　∗ Significant at the 10% level
Table 2　Logistic regression: Dependent variable: 
Probability that the company increase its EPS in 1994
Equation number Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6
Annual Incentive （AI） 0.354∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗
（0.134） （0.145）
New AI 0.218 0.0858
（0.149） （0.162）
Total pay sensitivity 0.752∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
（0.131） （0.128）
Total pay sensitivity change 1.025∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
（0.141） （0.157）
Constant 0.858∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗
（0.286） （0.275） （0.286） （0.287） （0.288） （0.292）
Industry dummy （2digit） Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log likelihood −817 −819 −816 −657 −710 −651
Pseudo-R2 0.0777 0.0751 0.0779 0.1569 0.0896 0.165
valid cases 1392 1392 1392 1298 1298 1298
Sensitivity change　1 if sensitivity intensified, 0 otherwise
Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parenthesis.
∗∗∗: Significant at the 1% level.　　∗∗ Significant at the 5% level.　　∗ Significant at the 10% level
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tionship between the change of pay policy and the change of firm 
performance. A strong positive correlation is observed between the change 
of pay-performance sensitivity and company performance. In other words, it 
is suggested that companies that intensify their pay-performance sensitivities 
are more likely to improve their performances.
The coefficients for newAI are also positive, though some are not signifi-
cant. In equation 2 in table 1, the coefficient for newAI is positive and 
significant, suggesting that companies that introduce annual incentives are 
more likely to improve their performances in the year than are other firms. 
These results are considered to be very important as both dependent and 
independent variables show changes. In other words, the change of pay policy 
is positively correlated with the change of firm performance.
The other important feature is that the coefficient for annual incentive 
(AI) is positive and significant. All coefficients for AI are positive and signifi-
cant. In other words, the companies with annual incentive programmes are 
more likely to improve their performances than those without. One important 
point is that the AI dummy does not show the level of the payment, but the 
way directors are paid.
Lastly, we find that coefficients for pay-performance sensitivity are all 
positive and significant. In other words, companies with performance-sensi-
tive incentive plans achieve higher performances than those companies 
without incentive plans. These findings support our hypotheses. These coeffi-
cients clearly show positive effects of performance-pay sensitivity on 
increases of company performance.
6. Conclusion
The most striking feature of this research is that there is a strong con-
nection between change in directors’ incentive plans and changes in the 
performances of firms. We redefine pay-performance sensitivity to assess 
whether companies intensify their sensitivities or not. This research is impor-
tant as many UK companies are trying to change their incentive 
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contracts for directors, in response to the Cadbury and Greenbury recom-
mendations.
Although there have been many papers on the determinants of the com-
pensations of executives, relatively few studies have examined the effect of 
pay policies of companies on the performances of firms. This research has 
provided the first systematic evidence that there is a positive relationship 
between directors’ incentive plans and firm performances in the UK.
It should be noted that our independent variables show how directors 
are paid, not how much they are paid, as they are not affected by the size of 
the company or level of compensation. In other words, the way directors are 
paid, not what they are paid, is important for firm performance.
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